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 COMMENT 
Password Please: The Effectiveness of 
New York’s First-in-Nation 
Cybersecurity Regulation of Banks 
By Melissa Knerr* 
ABSTRACT 
In March of 2017, New York enacted new cybersecurity legislation fo-
cused on regulating banking security. Cybersecurity attacks on the finan-
cial sector have risen recently and the federal and state governments are 
looking to combat data breaches. The regulations themselves strive to reg-
ulate security conduct by the financial institutions, including required test-
ing and risk assessment, training for cybersecurity personnel, and man-
dated reporting to upper-level staff as well as the New York Department 
of Financial Services. While these regulations are the first of their kind and 
strive to set in place certain basic requirements for cybersecurity, it re-
mains to be seen how effective they will truly be. There is concern that the 
regulations are sometimes redundant, and at other times not far reaching 
enough to have an impact on security concerns. Still, these regulations 
could be used as a framework for other government institutions going for-
ward. The effectiveness will likely not be seen until the requirements have 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Cybersecurity is the new “hot topic of the day.”1 Cybersecurity is a popular 
issue, especially because it is a developing field that changes rapidly as technology 
evolves.2 Discourse of cybersecurity was rampant during the 2016 presidential elec-
tion campaign, with a question about cybersecurity even making it into a presiden-
tial debate.3 In response to difficulties faced by financial institutions and the dangers 
to consumer privacy with cybersecurity attacks, regulators are starting to step in to 
impose cybersecurity regulations on banks.4 The New York Department of Finan-
cial Services (“NYDFS”) proposed a “first in the nation” cybersecurity legislation 
for banks that increase banking security.5 These proposed regulations were recently 
adopted, and went into effect on March 1, 2017.6 
One of the most important areas of ensuring quality cybersecurity is banking.7 
Currently, almost every bank has some sort of online platform for handling accounts 
and transactions.8 Computerized banking applications (“apps”) are becoming in-
creasingly popular, allowing customers to see account balances and even deposit 
checks purely through the app.9 Some banks also accept account or credit card ap-
plications through mobile apps or online sites.10 
Increased innovation has helped banking become more accessible and easier to 
use.11 Many banks have taken specific steps to gain a larger online presence.12 For 
example, in 2012, Capital One purchased ING Direct, a former Dutch online bank-
ing service, to serve as its own online banking service, now called Capital One 
360.13 Unfortunately, with all the innovation required to keep up with competition, 
cybersecurity can sometimes be left underdeveloped.14 
                                                          
*  Melissa Knerr is a third-year student at the University of Missouri School of Law. Melissa is 
originally from Philadelphia and received her bachelor’s degree in History and Classic Civilizations 
from Duquesne University. 
1.   Gregory S. McNeal, Banks Challenged by Cybersecurity Threats, State Regulators Acting, 
FORBES (May 26, 2014, 6:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2014/05/26/banks-chal-
lenged-by-cybersecurity-threats-state-regulators-acting/#62bf22e87c2c. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Eyragon Eidam, Presidential Debate 2016: Cybersecurity Highlights Significant Differences in 
Policy, Understanding Between Candidates, GOV’T TECH. (Sept. 27, 2016), 
http://www.govtech.com/security/Presidential-Debate-2016-Cybersecurity-Highlights-Significant-Dif-
ferences-in-Policy-Understanding-Between-Candidates.html. 
 4. McNeal, supra note 1. 
 5. Judith Germano, Proposed NY Cybersecurity Regulation: A Giant Leap Backward?, FORBES 
(Dec. 2, 2016, 2:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2016/12/02/proposed-ny-cybersecurity-
regulation-a-giant-leap-backward/#68fb19642e78. 
 6. New York Finalizes Cybersecurity Rules, ABA BANKING J. (Feb. 16, 2017), http://bankingjour-
nal.aba.com/2017/02/new-york-finalizes-cybersecurity-rules/ 
 7. McNeal, supra note 1. 
 8. Online Banking 101, FORTUNE (Jan. 11, 2017), http://fortune.com/video/2017/01/11/online-bank-
ing-101/. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Jim Marous, The Rise of the Digital-Only Banking Customer, FIN. BRAND (June 6, 2017), 
https://thefinancialbrand.com/65628/digital-banking-consumer-trends/. 
 13. Lawrence C. Strauss, Capital One Financial’s Savvy Plan for Growth, BARRON’S (Sept. 24, 2016, 
1:00 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/capital-one-financials-savvy-plan-for-growth-
1474693214. 
 14. Robert Hackett, Cybercrime is Outwitting, Outpacing Security, FORTUNE (May 28, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/05/28/cybercrime-is-outwitting-outpacing-security/. 
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Cyberattacks on the financial sector rose by about 937% between 2015 and 
2016.15 A recent report found that the financial “industry is attacked 65 percent 
more often than any other resulting in more than 200 million records being breached 
in 2016. . . .”16 This was a departure from previous cybercrime activity, as 2015 saw 
cyberattacks “focus[ed] on healthcare and retail [industries].”17 Around “58 percent 
of the attacks were due to insiders with only five percent of those being done mali-
ciously.”18 Meaning that a majority of cybersecurity breaches resulted from em-
ployee errors.19 
How then can banks protect themselves from these types of attacks, which of-
ten come from places around the globe and are very hard to trace?20 Many banks 
have taken significant steps to heighten their cybersecurity programs, but each in-
novation is challenged by the fast rate of technological change and threats that are 
increasingly more sophisticated.21 Banking institutions have found that it is difficult 
to keep up with cybersecurity developments while also keeping pace with market 
pressures to have new and cutting edge technologies in their products.22 The major-
ity of banks, about 90%, have certain “key pillars” in place to safeguard their infor-
mation security framework.23 These key pillars include the following: “a written 
information security policy, security awareness education and employee training, 
risk management of cyber-risk, inclusive of identification of key risks and trends, 
information security audits, and incident monitoring and reporting.”24 Banks are 
relying on internal and external departments to manage their IT needs.25 There are 
many tools at a bank’s disposal to guard against cyberattacks: “anti-virus software, 
spyware and malware detection, firewalls, server-based access control lists, intru-
sion detection tools, intrusion prevention systems, vulnerability scanning tools, en-
cryption for data in transit, and encrypted files.”26 
While it is commendable for a state legislature to try to address a widespread 
problem, it is unclear how effective these regulations will be. Ineffective regulations 
will not be helpful, and could make the situation worse. Regulations that include 
“inflexible and far-reaching state required mandates, only add to the growing 
clamor of distractions about how companies should best secure their systems.”27 
There is concern that an inflexible and far-reaching mandate is the type of regula-
tions the NYDFS is enacting.28 The drafters of the regulations claim that regulated 
standards for cybersecurity risks are needed, as long as they do not overextend 
                                                          
 15. Doug Olenick, Financial Services Sector Most Attacked in 2016: IBM, SC MEDIA (Apr. 28, 2017), 
https://www.scmagazine.com/financial-services-sector-most-attacked-in-2016-ibm/article/653706/. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Larry Greenemeier, Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace Back to Hack-
ers, SCI. AM. (June 11, 2011), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tracking-cyber-hackers/#. 
 21. McNeal, supra note 1. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. (it should be noted that the corresponding numbers for the list of items in the original source 
have been removed by the author). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Germano, supra note 5. 
 28. Id. 
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them.29 It is unclear, however, whether the actual regulations are appropriate and 
warranted. 
This article will seek to first discuss the content of the regulations, paying spe-
cific attention to the requirements placed on financial institutions’ cybersecurity 
systems, personnel, and senior officers. Next, the positive qualities of the regula-
tions will be discussed. These positive qualities include innovation, an emphasis on 
testing and risk assessment, and mandating several good, basic cybersecurity prin-
ciples. Finally, the negative qualities of the regulations will be critiqued as to their 
effectiveness at accomplishing the goal of the regulations: reducing cybercrime. 
These negative qualities include redundancy when compared to existing cybersecu-
rity guidelines, the scope of the required testing and risk assessment, and the poten-
tial burdens placed on covered entities. Potential solutions, where applicable, will 
be offered to increase the regulations’ effectiveness, as well as providing guidance 
for future cybersecurity regulations on how to avoid the mistakes of the New York 
Regulations. 
II.  NEW YORK’S FIRST-IN-NATION CYBERSECURITY REGULATION 
The new regulations from the NYDFS goes into effect on March 1st of 2017 
and banks will be given a period of 180 days to comply.30 The introduction to the 
regulations describes them as being “designed to promote the protection of cus-
tomer information as well as the information technology systems of regulated enti-
ties.”31 Specifically, the “regulation requires each company to assess its specific risk 
profile and design a program that addresses its risks in a robust fashion.”32 The reg-
ulation’s goal seems to have “certain regulatory minimum standards . . . while not 
being overly prescriptive so that cybersecurity programs can match the relevant 
risks and keep pace with technological advances.”33 The regulations place many 
requirements on the banks that are covered by the regulations and some of them 
may be redundant with cybersecurity procedures that banks already have in place, 
but this may differ from institution to institution. 
The first requirement under the new regulation states that “[e]ach [c]overed 
[e]ntity shall maintain a cybersecurity program designed to protect the confidenti-
ality, integrity and availability of the [c]overed [e]ntity’s [i]nformation [s]ys-
tems.”34 A “covered entity” is “any person operating under or required to operate 
under a license, registration, charter, certificate, permit, accreditation or similar au-
thorization under the [b]anking [l]aw, the [i]nsurance [l]aw or the [f]inancial 
[s]ervices [l]aw.”35 An “information system” is “a discrete set of electronic infor-
mation resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance . . . of elec-
tronic information, as well as any specialized system such as industrial/process con-
trols systems, telephone switching and private branch exchange systems, and 
                                                          
 29. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.00 (2017). 
 30. Id. §§ 500.21, 500.22(a). 
 31. Id. § 500.00. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. § 500.02(a). 
 35. Id. § 500.19(c). 
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environmental control systems.”36 Therefore, any bank subject to New York’s 
banking law must have a cybersecurity program in place to protect its electronic 
databases. 
The question then becomes, what is a cybersecurity program and what pro-
gramming criteria is required? This program must be based on the bank’s “risk as-
sessment.”37 The risk assessment is a periodic assessment “of the Covered Entity’s 
Information Systems sufficient to inform the design of the cybersecurity program 
as required by this Part.”38 The assessment should evaluate and categorize cyberse-
curity risks,39 assess confidentiality, integrity, security, and availability of the 
bank’s information systems and confidential information,40 and describe how risks 
will be mitigated, accepted, and addressed by the bank’s cybersecurity program.41 
The cybersecurity program should perform certain cybersecurity tasks such as 
the following: identify and assess internal and external cybersecurity risks,42 use 
defensive infrastructure and implement policies and procedures to protect infor-
mation systems and confidential information from cybersecurity attacks,43 detect 
cybersecurity attacks,44 respond to cybersecurity attacks to lessen negative effects,45 
recover from cybersecurity attacks and restore normal operations and services,46 
and fulfill regulatory reporting requirements.47 Information regarding the cyberse-
curity program must then “be made available to the superintendent upon request.”48 
Presumably, this is because the NYDFS wants access to the cybersecurity programs 
to ensure that they meet the above listed qualifications. 
The program should also have an incident response plan. This plan should be 
“designed to promptly respond to, and recover from, any [c]ybersecurity [e]vent 
materially affecting the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the [c]overed 
[e]ntity’s [i]nformation [s]ystems or the continuing functionality of any aspect of 
the [bank’s] business or operations.”49 The incident response plan should address 
the internal process for responding to a cybersecurity attack: goals of the plan, def-
initions of clear roles, responsibilities and levels of decision-making authority, ex-
ternal and internal communication and information sharing, identification of re-
quirements for the remediation of weaknesses in information systems, documenta-
tion and reporting regarding cybersecurity attacks, and the evaluation and revision 
of the incident response plan following a cybersecurity event.50 
The cybersecurity programs must also “include monitoring and testing, devel-
oped in accordance with the [c]overed [e]ntity’s [r]isk [a]ssessment, designed to 
assess the effectiveness of the [c]overed [e]ntity’s cybersecurity program.”51 This 
                                                          
 36. Id. § 500.01(e). 
 37. Id. § 500.02(b)(1). 
 38. Id. § 500.09(a). 
 39. Id. § (b)(1). 
 40. Id. § (b)(2). 
 41. Id. § (b)(3). 
 42. Id. § 500.02(b)(1). 
 43. Id. § (b)(2). 
 44. Id. § (b)(3). 
 45. Id. § (b)(4). 
 46. Id. § (b)(5). 
 47. Id. § (b)(6). 
 48. Id. § (d). 
 49. Id. § 500.16(a). 
 50. Id. § (b). 
 51. Id. § 500.05. 
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monitoring and testing must “include continuous monitoring or periodic [p]enetra-
tion [t]esting and vulnerability assessments.”52 Penetration testing is a form of test-
ing “in which assessors attempt to circumvent or defeat the security features of an 
[i]nformation [s]ystem by attempting penetration of databases or controls from out-
side or inside the [c]overed [e]ntity’s [i]nformation [s]ystems.”53 The cybersecurity 
program must include continuous or annual testing of the program’s security fea-
tures to ensure that they will hold up against a cybersecurity attack.54 The testing 
should be “based on relevant identified risks in accordance with the [r]isk assess-
ment . . . .”55 If continuous testing is unavailable, banks must conduct penetrative 
testing along with “bi-annual vulnerability assessments, including any systematic 
scans or reviews of [i]nformation [s]ystems reasonably designed to identify publicly 
known cybersecurity vulnerabilities in the [c]overed [e]ntity’s [i]nformation [s]ys-
tems based on the [r]isk [a]ssessment.”56 
In addition to testing requirements that must be included in the cybersecurity 
program, the cybersecurity program also must include restrictions on other areas 
including mobile apps, data storage, and encryption.57 There are requirements that 
include guidelines on the development of mobile banking apps within a bank’s cy-
bersecurity program.58 The cybersecurity program must include “written proce-
dures, guidelines and standards designed to ensure the use of secure development 
practices for in-house developed applications utilized by the [bank], and procedures 
for evaluating, assessing or testing the security of externally developed applications 
. . . .”59 The cybersecurity program must include procedures relating to data reten-
tion, specifically, a policy on how to dispose of data that is no longer necessary.60 
The cybersecurity program must include encryption to protect confidential infor-
mation that is “held or transmitted by the [bank] both in transit over external net-
works and at rest.”61 If the bank is unable to ensure encryption at rest or in transit 
they may use alternative methods that must be approved and reviewed annually by 
the Chief Information Security Officer (“CISO”).62 
Affected banks must also have a cybersecurity policy that stems from their cy-
bersecurity program.63 Each affected institution “shall implement and maintain a 
written policy . . . approved by a Senior Officer or the [c]overed [e]ntity’s board of 
directors . . . setting forth the [c]overed [e]ntity’s policies and procedures for the 
protection of its [i]nformation [s]ystems and [n]onpublic [i]nformation stored on 
those [i]nformation [s]ystems.”64 
The cybersecurity policy also needs to be based on the bank’s risk assessment.65 
This written policy should address: information security, data governance and clas-
sification, asset inventory and device management, access controls and identity 
                                                          
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. § 500.01(h). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. § 500.05(a). 
 56. Id. § (b). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. § 500.08(a). 
 60. Id. § 500.13. 
 61. Id. § 500.15(a). 
 62. Id. §§ (a)(1)-(2), (b). 
 63. Id. § 500.03. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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management, business continuity and disaster recovery planning and resources, sys-
tem operations and availability concerns, systems and network security and moni-
toring, systems and application development and quality assurance, physical secu-
rity and environmental controls, customer data privacy, vendor and third party man-
agement, risk assessment, and incident response. 66 Essentially, the cybersecurity 
policy should be a written explanation of the cybersecurity program’s functions. 
To enforce both the cybersecurity program and the cybersecurity policy, the 
bank should designate a CISO.67 The CISO has the responsibility to report to the 
board of directors or an equivalent governing body on the cybersecurity program 
and any “material cybersecurity risks.”68 In preparing the report, the CISO should 
consider: confidentiality of private information and the integrity and security of in-
formation systems,69 the bank’s cybersecurity policies and procedures,70 material 
cybersecurity risks,71 the effectiveness of the cybersecurity program,72 and cyberat-
tacks involving the bank during the report’s time period.73 The CISO is also respon-
sible for periodically reviewing and updating, as necessary, the procedures, guide-
lines, and standards around the development of mobile applications.74 
In addition to the above discussed requirements, the NYDFS requires more re-
porting and has more rules that banks must follow, which are covered under 23 
NYCRR § 500.75 Banks must maintain systems that “are designed to reconstruct 
material financial transactions sufficient to support normal operations and obliga-
tions”76 of the bank and “include audit trails designed to detect and respond to 
[c]ybersecurity [e]vents that have a reasonable likelihood of materially harming any 
material part of the normal operations” of the bank.77 Records of material financial 
transactions must be kept for at least five years.78 Records of audit trails must be 
kept for at least three years.79 Banks must also “limit user access privileges to 
[i]nformation [s]ystems that provide access to [n]onpublic [i]nformation and shall 
periodically review such access privileges.”80 
The NYDFS does not stop at security or reporting requirements, it places re-
strictions on the actions of company personnel as well. The regulations also provide 
that banks should “utilize qualified cybersecurity personnel . . . to manage the 
[bank’s] cybersecurity risks and to perform or oversee the performance of the core 
cybersecurity functions specified in the [regulations].”81 The personnel must also 
have training to address cybersecurity risks, in addition to verification by the bank-
ing employer that they are maintaining their knowledge of changing cybersecurity 
                                                          
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. § 500.04(a). 
 68. Id. § (b). 
 69. Id. § (b)(1). 
 70. Id. § (2). 
 71. Id. § (3). 
 72. Id. § (4). 
 73. Id. § (5). 
 74. Id. §  500.08(b). 
 75. Id. § 500.00. 
 76. Id. § 500.06(a)(1). 
 77. Id. § (a)(2). 
 78. Id. § (b). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. § 500.07. 
 81. Id. § 500.10(a)(1). 
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risks.82 Restrictions on personnel should also be placed directly into the bank’s cy-
bersecurity program, as discussed above. 
The cybersecurity program must “implement risk-based policies, procedures 
and controls designed to monitor the activity of [a]uthorized users and detect unau-
thorized access or use of [confidential] information . . .” and “provide regular cy-
bersecurity awareness training for all personnel that is updated to reflect risks iden-
tified by the [bank] in its [r]isk [a]ssessment.”83 Restrictions on personnel are also 
accompanied by restrictions on internal access and procedures on confidential in-
formation. The regulations require that the banks use multi-factor or risk-based au-
thentication as part of “effective controls” to protect against unauthorized access to 
confidential information or the systems they are kept on.84 Specifically, multi-factor 
authentication must be used “for any individual accessing the [bank’s] internal net-
works from an external network . . .” unless the bank has approved equal or stricter 
controls.85 
The regulations also include stringent notice requirements of cybersecurity 
events. Specifically, notice of cybersecurity attacks to the superintendent.86 The su-
perintendent of the Department of Financial Services supervises financial products 
and services.87 The superintendent is, incidentally, the person who enforces these 
regulations.88 The superintendent should be notified “as promptly as possible but in 
no event later than 72 hours” after a cybersecurity event has occurred.89 The event 
must be reported when notice of the event is required to be sent to a supervising 
body, or when it has a “reasonable likelihood of materially harming any material 
part” of the bank’s normal operations.90 It should then be assumed that any failure 
to provide proper notice would result in some sort of penalty, although these regu-
lations do not seem to outline what the penalty would be, nor how the superinten-
dent would find out about an unreported event. In addition to the requirements for 
reporting cybersecurity events, banks must also submit an annual report by Febru-
ary 15th of each year to the superintendent that certifies that they are in compliance 
with the rules of the regulations.91 The bank must keep all information related to 
compliance for five years and should keep a record of identified risks and cyberse-
curity events, along with remediation already taken, and what banks will do in the 
future to address risks.92 This information must always be available to the superin-
tendent for inspection.93 Again, it seems that not meeting these requirements would 
be accompanied with some sort of punishment from the superintendent or the 
NYDFS itself, but such a punishment is not outlined in the current regulations. 
Banks are given more time to comply with specific sections, outside of the in-
itial 180-day period stated above. For penetration testing and vulnerability 
                                                          
 82. Id. §§ (2)-(3). 
 83. Id. §§ 500.14(a)-(b). 
 84. Id. § 500.12(a). 
 85. Id. § (b). 
 86. Id. § 500.17(a). 
 87. About Us, DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/mission.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 
2017). 
 88. Id. 
 89. § 500.17(a). 
 90. Id. § (2). 
 91. Id. § (b). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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assessments, risk assessments, and the use of multi-factor authentication to access 
information systems and confidential data, banks have one year from March 1st of 
2017 to comply.94 Banks will also have 18 months from March 1st 2017 to establish 
an audit trail, having guidelines for the development of mobile apps, data retention, 
implementing risk-based monitoring of authorized users’ access to confidential in-
formation, and encryption of confidential information.95 Finally, banks have two 
years from March 1st to comply with § 500.11, which governs policies for third-
party cybersecurity service providers.96 
III.  EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGULATIONS: PROS 
The NYDFS’s regulations are extensive. It is very likely that the NYDFS’s 
regulations will be regarded as a model for what to do and not to do as more gov-
erning bodies consider adopting cybersecurity rules for financial institutions, or 
even other areas of business that deal with confidential data or online transactions.97 
Because the NYDFS’s regulations will serve as a sort of model for future regula-
tions, it is important to note what these regulations have done well and what needs 
to be improved upon. There are aspects to be praised about the regulations, includ-
ing the overall innovation of the regulations themselves, the focus on regular testing 
of data systems and measuring risks, and a good foundation of traditional security 
measures that should be taken. 
A.  Innovation 
First, these regulations should be praised because of their innovation. They are 
the most innovative of their kind, which in itself, deserves recognition.98 New York 
is the first state to take a large step forward to address cybersecurity in the financial 
sector.99 Currently, these regulations are the strictest civilian rules in the world.100 
A large state, like New York, with an even larger financial industry is a good place 
to begin implementing policies to address cyberattacks. These regulations could 
prove particularly helpful coming from a large state with ties to the financial indus-
try and an influential circuit court because “flagging efforts [by] the federal govern-
ment to provide any consistency in this area” have not accomplished much.101 These 
                                                          
 94. Id. §§ 500.22(a)-(b)(1). 
 95. Id. § (b)(2). 
 96. Id. § (3). 
 97. Mike Baukes, New York’s Cyber Security Regulations Aren’t Perfect, But Other States Ahould 
Pay Attention to Them, RECODE (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.recode.net/2017/2/28/14766044/new-
york-cyber-security-regulations-model-governr-cuomo. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Jon Oltsik, New York State Cybersecurity Regulations: Who Wins?, CSO (Feb. 23, 2017), 
http://www.networkworld.com/article/3173689/security/ny-state-cybersecurity-regulations-who-
wins.html. 
 101. Eric Levy, New York’s New Cybersecurity Regulations: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 
GARDERE (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.gardere.com/Newsroom/Alerts/204607/New-Yorks-New-Cy-
bersecurity-Regulations-The-Good-the-Bad-and-the-Ugly. 
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regulations also show a commitment to consumer protection and a policy shift on 
data privacy.102 
As policy continues to be developed, these regulations can be used as a model 
for other regulators, both state and federal, to make the developing process of their 
own regulations easier. However, while being first does merit recognition, it also 
indicates that the regulations will be outpaced by technology that much more 
quickly.103 The first compliance date has not hit yet but there are already signs that 
the regulations put forth by the NYDFS are “being outpaced by the reality of busi-
ness in the internet age.”104 Even if these regulations are outpaced, they can still 
provide insight for future drafters and are an attempt to combat the rise of cyberat-
tacks against financial institutions. 
B.  Regular Testing and Assessing of Risks 
Second, the NYDFS’s regulations place a large focus on regular testing of data 
systems and assessment risks. This can be seen in §§ 500.05 and 500.09, which 
outline penetration testing, vulnerability assessments, and risk assessment.105 The 
focus on testing is important because it is crucial in understanding how data systems 
will react to cyberattacks. Testing will ensure that data systems are running well, 
and it will expose any problems or holes in the institution’s systems.106 Regular 
testing ensures that the system is being updated frequently enough and that it re-
mains resilient in the face of cyberattacks.107 Regular risk assessment helps finan-
cial institutions prevent confidential information leaks.108 
Although the focus on testing is good, the regulations do not go far enough in 
their testing requirements. The regulations are more focused on administrative tasks 
dealing with the formation of policies, procedures, and positions rather than actual 
interaction with the bank’s cybersecurity system.109 The basic idea is that regular 
testing and risk assessment of data systems is good, but more guidance is needed to 
ensure quality and effectiveness of testing. 
C.  Foundation for Basic Cybersecurity Principles 
Finally, the NYDFS’s regulations establish a good basis for traditional cyber-
security practices, including: “limiting the distribution of personally identifiable in-
formation or requiring multifactor authentication . . . .”110 Limiting distribution can 
be found in § 500.07 and multifactor authentication in § 500.12.111 In addition, the 
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regulations also require extensive encryption of nonpublic information, both resting 
with the financial institution, and while in transit via external networks.112 All of 
these requirements are specifically technical in nature and are generally important 
to include in any cybersecurity system to ensure data protection. The NYDFS’s in-
clusion of these requirements is a positive step forward in ensuring all banks are 
practicing basic cybersecurity techniques. 
The regulations also call for ongoing and comprehensive training for cyberse-
curity personnel within the institution.113 Ongoing training is a must for in-house 
cybersecurity departments because technology dealing with cybersecurity is quick 
to change and rapidly develops unfamiliar problems.114 Innovative methods are 
needed to address those problems.115 In addition, it is speculated that employees are 
much more likely to cause daily data compromises through negligence or wrong-
doing than would an outside breach.116 These cybersecurity basics are a step for-
ward in the direction of universal cybersecurity procedures. However, it must be 
noted that these are just basics. It is highly likely that many of the financial institu-
tions covered under the NYDFS regulations already practice the methods required 
under the regulations, or the third-party company they outsource their cybersecurity 
to does.117 
In addition to other positive qualities listed above, the regulations also have the 
potential to serve as boilerplate requirements for future entities looking to mandate 
cybersecurity, whether those entities are other states, or the federal government 
looking to establish universal rules for cybersecurity. On the other hand, there are 
numerous problems with the regulations that should be addressed either by chang-
ing the regulations themselves, or adopting different policies when another govern-
ing body creates its own cybersecurity regulations. 
IV.  EFFECTIVENESS OF THE REGULATIONS: CONS 
This section addresses problems with the regulations and suggests potential 
ways to improve future cybersecurity regulation. Unfortunately, there are aspects 
of the regulations that are subject to criticism, specifically because they are not ef-
fective. These areas are: the redundancy of 23 NYCRR § 500 requirements when 
compared to already existing guidelines, the scope of the testing requirements, and 
the potential burden these regulations place on covered financial institutions.118 The 
ineffectiveness seems to come from a lack of overall consistency throughout the 
regulations. Some sections of the regulations feature an overabundance of regula-
tion and not enough in others. Improving upon these regulations is critical for con-
sumers and financial institutions going forward.119 
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A. Redundancy 
First, the biggest problem with the regulations is that they are extremely redun-
dant. Not redundant within the regulations itself, but redundant with current existing 
guidelines for financial institutions on cybersecurity procedures.120 Specifically, 23 
NYCRR § 500 is strikingly similar to cybersecurity regulations and guidance posed 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”), and the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (“FFIEC”).121 
The NIST published its Cybersecurity Framework in 2014 and drafted a pro-
posed update for the framework in January of 2017.122 This framework is voluntary 
and is meant to help “organizations manage cybersecurity risk in the nation’s criti-
cal infrastructure, such as bridges and the electric power grid” but has also been 
used frequently by other types of institutions around the world to help manage cy-
bersecurity risks.123 The NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework provided standards for 
the communication of cybersecurity risks throughout the organizational levels of 
the institution,124 managing cybersecurity risks,125 and the delivery of critical cy-
bersecurity services.126 While the cybersecurity framework is voluntary, it includes 
much of the same material that the mandatory New York regulations cover.127 Or-
ganizational communication is covered extensively by the New York regulations in 
§§ 500.03 and 500.04, which deal with the creation of the cybersecurity policy and 
its approval by the board of directors, and the appointment of a CISO.128 Managing 
cybersecurity risks and the running of cybersecurity services are both regulated un-
der 23 NYCRR § 500.129 These regulations share much in common with the Cyber-
security Framework published by the NIST. 
In June of 2015, the FFIEC released its Cybersecurity Assessment Tool, a cy-
bersecurity examination work program that allows financial institutions to under-
stand their inherent cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities when crafting a cyber-
security program.130 This assessment provided an individualized approach to cyber-
security, construing the assessment around the amount of cybersecurity risk each 
financial institution faced based on their connections and activities.131 It assessed 
inherent risk based upon “the type, volume, and complexity of operational consid-
erations, such as connection types, products and services offer, and technologies 
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used.”132 It also reviewed current practices and made recommendations for improv-
ing risk management and oversight, threat intelligence and collaboration, cyberse-
curity controls, external dependency management, and cyber incident management 
and resilience.133 
Again, the New York regulations share many similarities with the cybersecu-
rity suggestions in the FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool. New York’s cyber-
security regulations extensively cover risk management,134 oversight,135 cybersecu-
rity controls,136 dependence on external management,137 and managing cyber inci-
dents.138 While the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool is not mandatory139, it does pro-
vide far more than the NYDFS in individualized guidelines for financial institutions 
looking to evaluate their cybersecurity. 
The NIST’s Cybersecurity Framework and the FFIEC’s Cybersecurity Assess-
ment Tool are two of the most well-known guidelines for cybersecurity for busi-
nesses, and specifically for financial institutions.140 While institutions are not re-
quired to follow or use either of the guidelines, they do provide direction for com-
panies looking to update their cybersecurity without the pressure of government 
mandated action on cybersecurity.141 There are even some areas where the two 
guidelines work better than the mandated regulations at dealing with cybersecurity 
issues that many financial institutions face.142 
The guidelines discussed above are just two examples of many state depart-
ments that have programs or guidelines extremely similar to the New York regula-
tions.143 The regulations are also redundant when compared to guidelines published 
by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and regulations contained in the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which modernized how banks handle private individu-
als’ information.144 Because there is a great deal of guidance already present for 
cybersecurity programs used by financial institutions, it is not clear whether the 
New York regulations were really needed. They just serve to make aspects of the 
guidelines mandatory, but do so in a less individualized way. 
B. Scope 
Second, the requirements in 23 NYCRR § 500 include some of the more basic 
foundations of cybersecurity policy, including frequent testing of security sys-
tems.145 Such frequent testing is an important requirement to include, since frequent 
testing is often how weaknesses are identified in cybersecurity systems.146 Unfor-
tunately, the testing required by the regulations is not required often enough, or 
                                                          
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2. 
 134. § 500.09. 
 135. Id. § 500.04. 
 136. Id. § 500.02. 
 137. Id. § 500.11. 
 138. Id. § 500.16. 
 139. Oltsik, supra note 100. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Baukes, supra note 97. 
 146. Id. 
13
Knerr: Cybersecurity Regulation of Banks
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
552 B.E.T.R. [Vol. 1 2017 
applied to enough aspects of a cybersecurity system to really be of use in helping 
the financial institution identify weak areas, or protect consumer information.147 
The testing should be required much more frequently and the systems subject to the 
testing should be expanded. 
The regulations only require testing once per year and vulnerability assess-
ments twice per year.148 Testing done once a year is not nearly often enough to 
ensure that the financial institution’s systems are effective in reacting to threats, as 
new ones develop.149 Once a year testing is “akin to checking the weather forecast 
once a year and hoping it holds . . . for the [rest of the year].”150 Annual testing, or 
even bi-annual testing does not provide frequent enough updates to account for how 
quickly digital threats and information systems can change.151 While annual, bi-
annual, and quarterly timelines can work in other areas of business management, 
these timelines are much too broad to work for the management of technological 
aspects of a business. 
In addition, only requiring testing once a year “implies that systems should and 
will remain static for the given certification period.”152 Anything remaining static 
for a year in a business is likely not good, especially a cybersecurity system.153 
Technology, especially cybersecurity systems and threats against them, have a 
much more rapid pace of development than other areas that financial institutions 
review, and therefore, should require more frequent review.154 For example, requir-
ing monthly testing would do much more to ensure that cybersecurity information 
systems are staying effective against developing technology. Thus, drastically ex-
panding the frequency of required testing would increase the effectiveness of the 
regulations. 
Currently, the regulations only require annual penetrative testing and bi-annual 
vulnerability assessments of the financial institution’s information systems.155 Test-
ing of an information system is not enough to ensure that a cybersecurity system is 
secure against attacks.156 There are numerous other systems that should be tested in 
addition to the information systems, since these systems are all interconnected in 
protecting against breaches.157 These others systems are data, access, and opera-
tional systems.158 Misconfigurations in systems and even between systems working 
together will cause 99% of firewall breaches by 2020, rather than pure security or 
firewall flaws.159 Regular testing of all systems helps craft efficient cybersecurity 
policy and “creates trust in the systems themselves.”160 Frequent testing of all sys-
tems provides visibility and notification of misconfigurations that could otherwise 
remain unnoticed until a cybersecurity attack exploits them.161 While testing of 
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information systems is a good start, in order to be more effective at combating cy-
bersecurity issues, testing should be expanded to include all systems used in a 
bank’s cybersecurity framework. 
While the regulations take important steps in including testing of information 
systems, they do not go far enough in scope. To be an effective mandate on cyber-
security policy, the regulations need to increase the frequency of testing from the 
current one year requirement and increase the amount of systems subject to frequent 
penetrative testing. Taking these steps will ensure that the regulation requirements 
are doing all they can to effectively combat cybersecurity threats against financial 
institutions. 
C. Burden on Covered Entities 
There are multiple requirements set by the regulations that could prove difficult 
for the covered financial institutions to comply with, both on a practical and policy 
level. There are new education requirements on financial institution’s cybersecurity 
personnel that could prove difficult to accomplish due to a shortage of qualified 
applicants and difficulties in keeping up with training.162 Also, the new focus on 
upper management accountability and certification could provide new liability is-
sues in the case of a breach involving customer data.163 Theses aspects could place 
a substantial burden on any of the covered entities attempting to comply with the 
New York Regulations. 
The New York Regulations require that covered financial institutions have 
qualified cybersecurity personnel, provide these personnel with training and up-
dates to address changing cybersecurity risks, and verify that they maintain 
knowledge of changing threats and countermeasures to cybersecurity systems.164 
Research from the Enterprise Strategy Group (“ESG”)165 showed that 45% of sur-
veyed internet technology and cybersecurity professionals reported a shortage of 
cybersecurity skills in their organization in 2017.166 In addition, ESG research from 
2016 reported that 42% of surveyed organizations said that it was either difficult, 
or very difficult for them “to recruit and hire cybersecurity professionals in the first 
place.”167 These responses are likely because of an increasingly competitive market 
for cybersecurity talent among banks.168 
Providing updated training and verifying that cybersecurity employees main-
tain their knowledge will be at the very least costly, if not outright prohibitive for 
banks to accomplish.169  In a series of reports by ESG and the Systems Security 
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Association, results showed that 56% of surveyed cybersecurity professionals re-
sponded that their employer did not “provide them with the right level of ongoing 
training to keep up with current risks and threats.”170 In addition, the reports showed 
that there are many cybersecurity workers who feel that they are too busy, or too 
overworked to dedicate time to training and keeping up with technological advance-
ments on their own.171 Importantly, financial institutions can discharge these re-
quirements by employing a third party service provider for their cybersecurity 
needs, which does not discharge their responsibility to ensure that the service pro-
vider is following the regulations requirements.172 While the training and 
knowledge requirements themselves are a practical requirement, implementation of 
them among the covered financial institutions could prove difficult because of a 
shortage of qualified employees, a difficulty in ensuring proper training, and the 
lack of time employees have for training. 
The New York Regulations place an emphasis on management involvement 
and responsibility in applying cybersecurity policy.173 This emphasis is present as 
early as the introduction to the regulations, which states: “[s]enior [m]anagement 
must take this issue seriously and be responsible for the organization’s cybersecu-
rity program and file an annual certification confirming compliance with these reg-
ulations.”174 There are five sections that refer to approval from upper level manage-
ment like a board member or the CISO, a position required by the regulations.175 
Certification of compliance by the board, CISO, or another senior officer, could 
potentially open the entire financial institution and the certifying individuals to lia-
bility from customer litigation, or regulatory repercussions in a situation where the 
financial institution did not comply or where a cybersecurity event occurred involv-
ing customer data.176 The regulations state that they will be enforced “under any 
applicable laws.”177 The enforcement could include a variety of New York laws, 
including banking and insurance, that contain both “civil and criminal penalties for 
intentionally making false statements to DFS.”178 
While the New York Regulations attempt to take steps forward to protect con-
sumer information and financial data systems, these steps come at the cost of a much 
higher burden to the covered financial institutions.179 Employee hiring and training 
requirements will most likely strain companies already struggling to hire and effec-
tively train cybersecurity professionals. The increased focus on managerial involve-
ment could also leave the company, and senior officers, especially the CISO, open 
to individual liability for compliance problems or cybersecurity attacks.180 These 
factors, combined with the pressure they are already under to quickly comply with 
                                                          
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.11 (2017). 
 173. Id. § 500.00. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. §§ 500.03, 500.04, 500.08, 500.12, 500.15. 
 176. Bruno, supra note 163. 
 177. § 500.20. 
 178. Mark Andruskiewicz, Clarke Cummings, & Michael Horn, Cyber: New York Regulator Moves 
the Goalposts, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS: FIN. CRIMES OBSERVER 3 (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/financial-crimes/publications/assets/NY-DFS-proposes-
cybersecurity-regulations. 
 179. Oltsik, supra note 162. 
 180. Bruno, supra note 163. 
16
The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 1 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss2/10
No. 2] Knerr; Cyber-Security Regulation of Banks 555 
the regulations, will likely place a large burden on the covered financial institutions 
from a monetary and personnel standpoint. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The New York regulations are clearly a complex piece of legislation. Cyberse-
curity concerns affect numerous parts of a financial institution, and so does this 
legislation. The newly enacted regulations come after a long comment period and 
extensive revision.181 The first draft of the legislation had over 150 comments filed 
on it, which was proposed in September of 2016.182 Even with the large amount of 
input, it is unclear if these regulations succeed in their stated purpose, or in combat-
ing cybersecurity events at all. 
There are aspects of the regulations that should be praised and referred to when 
future regulations are drafted: innovation, focus on testing of data systems and risk 
assessment, and a foundation of good cybersecurity practices. However, the regu-
lations are not perfect and it remains to be seen whether they will have as large of 
an effect as the NYDFS expects them to. The regulations are often redundant with 
existing cybersecurity guidelines, the testing requirements are not broad enough to 
really make a difference with evolving cybersecurity threats, and place personnel 
and monetary burdens on covered banks through hiring and training requirements 
along with opening both the bank and senior officers to personal liability. 
Compliance with the New York Regulations comes with numerous pros and 
cons and because they are mandatory for any bank doing business in New York, it 
is likely that many banks will be covered under the regulations. It will be interesting 
to see how the banks go about compliance, perhaps there will be an increase in third 
party cybersecurity services. It is yet to be determined as to what kind of an impact 
these regulations will have on cybersecurity threats, which have only been increas-
ing in complexity and frequency. While these regulations are the first of their kind, 
and only affect one state, they could easily serve as a framework and springboard 
for other states and regulatory bodies to craft their own cybersecurity requirements, 
likely increasing the burden on banks across the nation. These newly enacted regu-
lation’s effects will only be known when the results of compliance or non-compli-
ance is seen. 
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